Miljardu projekta F35 defekti, kas pagaidām tiek novērst:
A 2014 Pentagon report found these issues:
First two mission data sets available November 2015, after USMC IOC.
Overall operational suitability relies heavily on contractor support and unacceptable workarounds.
Aircraft availability reached 51% but short of 60% goal.
Fuel Tanks don't retain inerting for required 12 hours after landing.
High dynamic loads on the rudder at lower altitudes in 20-26 AoA preventing testing.
82 pounds added to F-35B in last 38 months, 337 pounds below limit.
Transonic Roll-Off (TRO) and airframe buffet continue to be program concerns.
572 deficiencies remain affecting Block 2B capability, 151 of which are critical.
VSim would likely not support planned Block 2B operational testing in 2015.
Maintainability hours still an issue.
ALIS requires many manual workarounds.
A 2015 Pentagon report found these issues:
The Joint Program Office is re-categorizing or failing to count aircraft failures to try to boost maintainability and reliability statistics;
Testing is continuing to reveal the need for more tests, but the majority of the fixes and for capability deficiencies being discovered are being deferred to later blocks rather than being resolved;
The F-35 has a significant risk of fire due to extensive fuel tank vulnerability, lightning vulnerability and an OBIGGS system unable to sufficiently reduce fire-sustaining oxygen, despite redesigns;
Wing drop concerns are still not resolved after six years, and may only be mitigated or solved at the expense of combat maneuverability and stealth;
The June engine problems are seriously impeding or preventing the completion of key test points, including ensuring that the F-35B delivered to the Marine Corps for IOC meets critical safety requirements; no redesign, schedule, or cost estimate for a long-term fix has been defined yet, thereby further impeding g testing;
Even in its third iteration, the F-35’s helmet continues to show high false-alarm rates and computer stability concerns, seriously reducing pilots’ situational awareness and endangering their lives in combat;
The number of Block 2B’s already limited combat capabilities being deferred to later blocks means that the Marine Corps’ FY2015 IOC squadron will be even less combat capable than originally planned;
ALIS software failures continue to impede operation, mission planning, and maintenance of the F-35, forcing the Services to be overly reliant on contractors and “unacceptable workarounds”;
Deficiencies in Block 2B software, and deferring those capabilities to later blocks, is undermining combat suitability for all three variants of the F-35;
The program’s attempts to save money now by reducing test points and deferring crucial combat capabilities will result in costly retrofits and fixes later down the line, creating a future unaffordable bow wave that, based on F-22 experience, will add at least an additional $67 billion in acquisition costs; and
Low availability and reliability of the F-35 is driven by inherent design problems that are only becoming more obvious and difficult to fix.